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Normalizing Deviance: 30 Years After the Challenger Explosion 
Introduction 
Safety is the number one priority at Albemarle.  Unfortunately, safety and environmental 
incidents do still happen in our industry, but when they do, learning from those incidents is 
critical to ensuring that they never happen again.  We believe that sharing those lessons learned 
with others in the industry will help keep us all safer.  To that end, a recent incident involving 
Normalization of Deviance is presented below. 
Normalization of Deviance (NoD) is a concept developed by Dr. Diane Vaughan following the 
1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster.  While the concept has been frequently discussed over 
the last 30 years, the author questions whether industry has addressed the issue on all fronts.  A 
significant NoD incident within Albemarle Corporation was motivation to fully explore the 
original concept.  The intent of this paper is to highlight the potential gaps in understanding of 
Normalization of Deviance, to suggest possible avenues to close the gaps, and to solicit industry-
wide effort to develop meaningful programs. 
Albemarle Incident 
On August 3, 2014, Albemarle’s Magnolia, AR site had a failure in the tangent of a bottom 
nozzle on a jacketed, glass-lined “reactor” (R-102).  At the time of the release, the vessel 
contained a significant amount of bromine, solid product, and water.  The entire content of the 
vessel was released.  Fortunately, passive mitigation safeguards were in place that collected the 
majority of the bromine in a process water sump.  Since bromine has a specific gravity of 3.0, it 
forms a separate phase beneath water and fuming is essentially eliminated.  Still, during the 
release there was evaporation from the stream of bromine that flowed between the vessel and the 
sump.  It is estimated that 10% of the material was released to the air over a period of 60 
minutes.  As soon as the problem was identified, Albemarle reacted quickly.  Personnel at the 
site were required to shelter-in-place and no one was exposed to the release.  The vapor cloud did 
not leave the site boundaries. 
Albemarle’s safety protocols require that a thorough investigation be conducted.  The Magnolia 
site processes many highly corrosive chemicals and typically uses glass-lined steel vessels in 
processing.  The Albemarle Engineering Standards require glass-lined steel vessels to be 
manufactured and supplied as “plug-free1”.  Though plugs are not allowed in purchased vessels, 
tantalum patches and teflon nozzle sleeves are allowed in the vapor space of in-service vessels.  
As an added safeguard, vessels that have been repaired in this fashion are required to have an 
internal inspection at least every 6 months.  R-102 had both a tantalum patch and a nozzle sleeve 
in the vapor space of the vessel. 
Approximately one year prior to the incident, a “fish-eye” was noted during a routine internal 
inspection of R-102.  A “fish-eye” is an occlusion or imperfection in the glass lining.  In this 
case, the area of concern was in the tangent on the bottom nozzle of the vessel.  The inspector 
identified the issue, performed a spark test2 to verify glass integrity and noted the issue in his 
report.  Since the vessel passed all of the inspection parameters, it remained on a six-month 
inspection schedule.  Similarly, there were no issues noted during the next inspection. 
Less than 3 months prior to the failure, the process experienced a quality excursion that 
suggested the glass may be compromised.  Knowing the recent inspection history of R-102, 
Operations Management shutdown the process and requested an early internal inspection of the 
vessel.  The inspector performed another spark test but did not identify any issues.  The source of 
the process issue was later found and corrected.  It was not associated with R-102. 
As mentioned, Corporate Engineering Standards allow the use of tantalum patches in the vapor 
space of glass-lined vessels with the requirement that the internal inspection frequency be 
increased to at least twice per year.  Even with these highly corrosive chemicals, the risk is 
deemed low in most instances due to the location of the patches and the corrosion rate of the 
chemicals.  The location is important because the severity of a release is mitigated in the vapor 
space.  Since these vessels run at lower pressures (~30 psig), a release from the vapor space 
could be managed and would occur at a much lower mass rate than a liquid release.  The 
corrosion rate of the chemical is important because the primary safeguards are the inspection 
interval and the ability to detect iron (glass failure) through sampling measures.   
Inherent in any inspection interval is the belief that problems can be identified and repaired prior 
to experiencing significant damage to the vessel.  In most of the Magnolia bromine processes, 
these safeguards are effective because the corrosion rate of mild steel is quite low3 if the bromine 
is dry4.  Therefore, should glass failure occur, the dry bromine will cause a gradual corrosion 
mechanism that could be reasonably detected by the inspection and sampling measures.  
                                                            
1 If there are small defects in the glass lining, suppliers may choose to repair the issue rather than reglass the entire 
vessel.  The repair is made by drilling a hole through the glass and into the carbon steel metal.  A corrosion resistant 
(usually tantalum) plug is then inserted into the hole. 
2 A spark test is an inspection technique to verify the integrity of a non-metallic liner.  A metal brush with 
approximately 5,000 V DC is swept along the surface of the liner.  If metal is contacted, a spark will occur. 
3 At 1.2 ppm water, test data suggests that liquid bromine corrodes mild steel at a rate of 0.0085 inches per year. 
4 These systems are inherently dry because bromine is mixed with oleum or aluminum chloride. 
Unfortunately, the same is not true for R-102.  Water is purposely added to the mixture of 
bromine and solid product in this vessel.  Once the water has been added to the system, the 
bromine becomes saturated with water and the corrosion rate changes significantly5.  In fact, it is 
estimated that should the glass liner fail in this service, the steel shell will be compromised 
within 4 days. 
In retrospect, the Magnolia plant should have stopped the operation of R-102. 
 The location of the fish-eye was “worst-case”.  In the tangent of the bottom nozzle, a 
failure would immediately allow chemicals to be released to atmosphere, the release 
would be liquid, and the release would be uncontrolled – a complete loss of the vessel 
contents.   
 The wet bromine service ensured a high corrosion rate; a rate that rendered the two 
safeguards useless.  There was not enough time to detect and respond. 
The work group did not see this situation as abnormal when compared to other vessels.  It was 
common to use inspection frequency and sampling measures to monitor the existing patches.  So, 
they followed the “normal” course of action.  It is a necessary characteristic of Normalization of 
Deviance that the work group is blinded to their folly.  In investigating the Challenger incident, 
Dr. Diane Vaughan looked not only at how performance was normalized but also at the striking 
disparity between post-accident investigator’s labeling of NASA actions as deviant while the 
Engineers involved in these same actions considered them normal and acceptable when they 
occurred (1).
In the Magnolia incident, it can be argued that no systems failed and no direct error was made.  It 
was a lack of identification and lack of action by a group of people that created the 
circumstances.  It was this work group blindness that propagated Normalization of Deviance.  
The remainder of this paper is intended to further investigate this issue.  However, for 
completeness, Appendix A includes an example of a glass repair matrix that was developed to 
address the specific incident discussed above. 
Challenger Disaster 
                                                            
5 While it is unreasonable to test such conditions, interpolation of existing data suggests the corrosion rate may be 
100 inches per year at 650 ppm water. 
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded 
resulting in the death of seven crew members.  The primary 
causal factor was identified to be hot gas bypass of both the 
primary and secondary O-rings on the Solid Rocket Boosters 
(SRB) that impacted and penetrated the external fuel tanks (2).  
It is believed that unusually cold weather in Florida, in the 24 
hours preceding the launch contributed to the O-ring failure 
(2).  Figure 1 shows the design of the tang and clevis 
construction of the SRB joints and the role that the two O-rings 
played in separating the burning propellant from the exterior of 
the shuttle. 
The potential for O-ring failure was a known problem.  In fact, 
managers and engineers at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center, 
NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center, and Morton Thiokol 
(the contractor for construction of the Solid Rocket Motor) 
were all aware of the problem and participated in a late night 
meeting on January 27 to discuss the possibility of O-ring failure due to cold weather (1). 
The subsequent investigations into the incident revealed that the concern about potential O-ring 
problems had been identified prior to the first space shuttle launch.  Such damage was tracked 
after each of the 27 flights prior to the Challenger incident.  Following the incident, many people 
proposed reasons for NASA launching with known O-ring issues.  In the Presidential 
Commission report, Dr. Richard Feynman suggested that safety was compromised to meet 
schedule requirements. 
If a reasonable launch schedule is to be maintained, engineering often cannot be done fast 
enough to keep up with the expectation of originally conservative certification criteria 
designed to guarantee a very safe vehicle.  In these situations, subtly, and often with 
apparently logical argument, the criteria are altered so that flights may still be certified in 
time.  They therefore fly in relatively unsafe condition, with a chance of failure of the 
order of a percent (2). 
Another common reason given was that in considering a flight delay due to cold weather, NASA 
set an unreasonable expectation for engineers by requiring them to prove a failure was imminent.  
This belief is likely grounded in post-event comments by Thiokol engineers that on the night 
prior to the fatal launch, they (Thiokol) were put in a position requiring them to validate a no-fly 
position due to the past development of risk tolerance – a risk tolerance previously developed 
and supported by Thiokol (2).  In other words, Thiokol had previously supported launching even 
when O-ring damage was expected.  The night before the Challenger launch Thiokol engineers 
were required to convince everyone (NASA, Marshall, and Thiokol) that previous Thiokol flight 
readiness recommendations had been wrong. 
As detailed in Vaughan’s book, The Challenger Launch Decision - Risky Technology, Culture, 
and Deviance at NASA, both of these are very simplistic models of the issues associated with the 
incident.  Even the engineers who were arguing against a launch did not believe the SRB would 
fail; they were merely concerned about operating at conditions that increased risk.  With one 
exception, they did not believe a complete burn-through of both O-rings was possible (1).   
So, what was the reason for the poor decision to launch?  In The Challenger Launch Decision, 
Vaughan introduced the concept of Normalization of Deviance (NoD).  Her detailed 
investigation identified three areas that combined to allow NoD to be established and maintained 
- the production of a work group culture, the culture of production, and structural secrecy. 
Production of work group culture – “How did we get here” 
Vaughan’s description of the “production of work group culture” is the common industry 
concept of Normalization of Deviance.  Simplistically, it can be considered the “How did we get 
here?” aspect.  It is the procession of actions and decisions that lead groups into “normal” work 
processes that are unwise.  For the Challenger’s Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) work group, this 
began with the initial design of the motor and a belief in redundancy. 
The beginning premise of the SRB work group was that their joint design was safer than the 
respected and proven Titan rocket design (1).  It was safer because an additional O-ring had been 
added and was considered to be a redundant safeguard.  During testing, prior to any shuttle 
launch, the SRB joint deviated from the designed performance (1).  The tang and clevis 
connections deflected and allowed the O-rings to unseat.  The engineers involved followed 
NASA procedures and treated the deviation as a signal of potential danger – documenting and 
reporting it as required.  However, since the joint design was unique, there was no precedent for 
responding to the problem. 
The production of work group culture was a sequence of actions that began with an unexpected 
problem (joint deviation) that had no defined solution.  Vaughan identified five steps in the 
sequence of events that were integral to the production of work group culture. 
1. Signals of potential danger 
2. Official act acknowledging escalated risk 
3. Review of evidence 
4. Official act of normalizing the deviation – accepting risk 
5. Shuttle launch 
After tests revealed the joint deviation, the work group devoted time and resources to further 
investigate and test both the O-rings and the joint dynamics.  Ultimately, when the group 
reviewed the evidence, they believed that the primary O-ring could only fail in a worst-case 
scenario and they believed that the secondary O-ring would be available as a backup, should this 
unlikely event occur (1).   
Next, the work group presented its findings through NASA’s four-tiered review process where 
the joint was eventually certified as flight-worthy by the Verification and Certification 
Committee.  By declaring the joint deviation as accepted and expected performance of the 
shuttle, the work group’s construction of risk became the official NASA organizational 
construction of risk.  This process is similar to that experienced in the chemical industry after 
scenarios are identified in a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) or Layer of Protection Analysis 
(LOPA).  The PHA team will meet with site or corporate management to review the significant 
scenarios and discuss whether safeguards are sufficient to meet the company’s risk tolerance. 
Finally, since no problems were found after the first mission, the official construction of risk and 
the SRB work group’s technical justification was confirmed.  In subsequent flights, when 
primary O-ring damage was found, the response was to attempt to improve O-ring performance 
rather than redesign the joints.   
Thus, the system was primed for repeated rounds of identification, escalation, and acceptance of 
risk.  Also, O-ring damage became an expected result of flight rather than an anomaly.  Vaughan 
describes the situation as follows: 
The significance of the above sequence of events lies not in its initial occurrence, but in 
its repetition.  Decision making became patterned.  Many times in the shuttle’s history, 
information indicated that the O-rings deviated from performance expectations, thus 
constituting a signal of potential danger.  Each time, the above decision sequence 
occurred.  The connection between some incident in the past and the present is 
demonstrated when it is repeated.  Patterns of the past – in this case, decision-making 
patterns pertaining to technical components – constitute part of the social context of 
decision making in the present.  This decision-making pattern indicates the development 
of norms, procedures, and beliefs that characterized the work group culture (1). 
The culture of production – Why did we stay there? 
Vaughan called the second area that contributed to Normalization of Deviance in the Challenger 
incident, “the culture of production.”  Simplistically, it can be considered the, “Why did we stay 
there?” aspect.  For the purposes of the Challenger investigation and this paper, “the culture of 
production” can be assumed to be referring to Engineering and Technical Management culture.  
Vaughan uses Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as a reference for much of 
the assessment of culture.  For simplicity, this will be referred to as engineering culture. 
Engineering culture follows specific rules that are based on experience.  Any number of codes 
and standards could be cited to support this statement.  Alternately, when a situation arises that is 
unique; since there are no established rules, the rules will follow the evolving practice.  When 
technology develops in ways not covered by existing codes, standards, or procedures, Engineers 
must create informal expectations.  These informal expectations become a paradigm; a typical 
and accepted pattern.  In other words, once the informal expectation is accepted, it becomes 
“experience” and will become the pattern for addressing the situation.  In fact, according to 
Kuhn, normal science does not aim to break the paradigm but only to support it.  Any event or 
circumstance that does not fit the paradigm is often not seen at all (3). 
For the SRB team, once the O-ring concern was voiced, defended as an acceptable risk by the 
Engineers, and accepted in Flight Readiness Reviews by NASA leaders, it became the accepted 
paradigm (1).  Once established, the paradigm became the basis for future decisions.  Engineers 
described Flight Readiness Reviews as technically intimidating situations.  Presenters understood 
that statements like, “I think” or “I feel” would draw the wrath of superiors.  Only data-based, 
engineering-supported positions were acceptable for presentations (1).  For these reasons, the 
fact that the group continued to recommend launch, while at the same time worrying about the 
long term viability of the O-ring system, made sense within the Engineering culture.   
According to Kuhn, the difficulty in overturning a scientific paradigm is due to the worldview it 
creates; it is overturned when a crisis arises that causes a transformation of that worldview (3).  
So, unique situations lead to new paradigms that, if poorly constructed, can lead to blind 
compliance in an unsafe situation.  Normally, in these cases, a crisis is required to break the 
paradigm and transform the rules of “normal” science.  Such a crisis could be a large bromine 
release or the explosion of a space shuttle. 
Structural Secrecy – “Why didn’t someone stop us?” 
The third area that contributed to the Normalization of Deviance in the Challenger incident is 
referred to as “structural secrecy.”  Vaughan describes structural secrecy as the way 
organizational structures can inhibit the transfer of information that provides the desired 
knowledge.  This is particularly true for large organizations like NASA since most actions are 
not observable.  Simplistically, it can be considered the, “Why didn’t someone stop us?” aspect. 
Specialization inhibits knowledge transfer because people in different departments lack the 
expertise to understand the work of others or appreciate its impact on their area of responsibility.  
Language used in tasks or used to describe incidents can be incredibly vague due to acronyms 
and jargon.  Changing standards and technology also inhibit knowledge because of the difficulty 
in keeping up of the latest developments while also attending to primary job duties. 
In an effort to overcome this issue, companies find formal ways to transmit complex information 
with the belief that knowledge will also be conveyed.  Ironically, this can result in less 
knowledge transfer.  Fine distinctions disappear in standardized forms.  More importantly, the 
amount can increase to the point that much is not read and the whole enterprise serves as more 
symbolic than true communication.  In Vaughan’s words, “Obfuscation parades as clarity: they 
produce too much, obscuring rather than enlightening” (1). 
Companies respond to this excessive information by developing a formal program that reduces 
the amount that flows to the top decision makers.  This is necessary to ensure that certain 
information receives adequate attention.  Unfortunately, information can be lost in this 
distillation process leading to uncertainty.  Uncertainty can lead top decision makers to rely on 
signals to simplify the issues.  However, as can be seen with the Challenger incident, signals do 
not always ensure knowledge transfer. 
Vaughan identified three types of signals that impeded knowledge transfer with regard to the 
Challenger’s O-rings.  Since the information was accumulating over a long period of time, it 
looked very different to the work group than it did to the post-accident investigators. 
 Signals were mixed – Signals 
of trouble were interspersed 
with signals that problems had 
been solved.  In addition, 
every time the SRB work 
group made a presentation, 
prior to a launch, they were 
simultaneously announcing O-
ring concerns while supporting 
flight readiness (1).  For this 
reason, the concern was 
mollified, documented, and 
accepted.  
 Signals were weak – The 
information was ambiguous 
and the threat was not clear 
(1).  When the need arose on 
night before the Challenger 
launch, it proved to be 
impossible to topple the risk 
paradigm because the cold 
weather concern was not 
supported by “solid” evidence 
or data.  As can be seen, Figure 2 does not show a correlation between temperature 
and O-ring thermal distress.  Therefore, it was ineffective at convincing people that a 
no-fly recommendation was necessary.  Figure 3 was developed post-accident and 
includes launches without O-ring issues.  This gives a much stronger signal that 
temperature should be a concern. 
 Signals were routine – For the entire Space Shuttle organization, O-ring erosion 
became a frequent and predictable result of shuttle service (1). 
 
Applications of Vaughan’s Model 
Dr. Vaughan’s model for Normalization of Deviance has several implications for the chemical 
industry.  First, NoD is typically only associated with the Production of Work Group Culture 
aspect.  This is the “How did we get here?” aspect of NoD.  The tools typically use to prevent 
this type of issue are the base systems associated with a strong process safety program.  These 
include Process Hazard Analysis, Management of Change, and Procedures/Standards.  If these 
programs are 100% effective, they should prevent a NoD situation from occurring.  
Unfortunately, it is unlikely, if not impossible, for these programs to perform perfectly.  Since 
NoD situations lead to situational blindness for those participating in the work group, we must 
also concentrate on the other two aspects. 
Systems to break paradigms and improve knowledge transfer are not a part of a traditional 
process safety program.  In fact, rather than an engineering aspect, these topics fall into the realm 
of psychology.  Therefore, rather than looking to industry-wide management systems, the 
decision was made to investigate High Reliability Organizations (HRO).  It was assumed that the 
same attributes that define a successful HRO would be attributes to combat Normalization of 
Deviance. 
Concepts on High Reliability Organizations 
Traditionally, the concept of a High Reliability Organizations (HRO) has been tied to proven 
performance.  An HRO was a company that displayed a high level of safety over an extended 
period of time (4).  A more modern definition of a High Reliability Organization is tied to 
probability of catastrophe.  In this model, an HRO is a company that must constantly manage 
catastrophic risk in order to meet the demands of the business (5).   
In Managing the Unexpected, Sustained Performance in a Complex World, Karl E. Weick and 
Kathleen M. Sutcliffe provide a quote from Gene Rochlin that may be more familiar to those 
working in the chemical industry.  
High reliability organizations (HROs) “seek an ideal of perfection but never expect to 
achieve it.  They demand complete safety but never expect it.  They dread surprise but 
always anticipate it.  They deliver reliability but never take it for granted.  They live by 
the book but are unwilling to die by it…” (5) 
In Managing the Unexpected, Weick and Sutcliffe attribute the superior performance of HROs to 
five factors. 
1. Preoccupation with Failure 
2. Reluctance to Simplify 
3. Sensitivity to Operations 
4. Commitment to Resilience 
5. Deference to Expertise 
 
Preoccupation with Failure 
Preoccupation with failure describes a company that is continually looking for system deviations 
that could be symptoms of larger problems.  There are three areas where preoccupation with 
failure is needed (5).   
1. Detecting small, emerging failures that may be clues to additional failures elsewhere in 
the system.  Many companies address this area with leading process safety metrics. 
2. Anticipating significant mistakes that need to be avoided.  This area is the purpose of 
qualitative risk assessments such as Process Hazard Analyses.  
3. Understanding that people’s knowledge of the situation, the environment, and their own 
group is incomplete.  This is the area of the “culture of production” that Vaughan 
describes.  Weick and Sutcliffe explain, “Success narrows perceptions, changes attitudes, 
reinforces a single way of doing things, breeds overconfidence in current practices, and 
reduces acceptance of opposing points of view (5). 
This third area of “preoccupation with failure” is sometimes referred to as a “sense of 
vulnerability” in Process Safety culture surveys.   According to researchers, it may be absolutely 
necessary for making rational risk decisions.  Psychologist Dr. Daniel Kahneman writes about an 
affect heuristic where people unconsciously make choices and decisions that express their 
feelings.  Overconfidence in our safety will lead us to make unreasonably risky decisions.  
Kahneman explains that researchers “have observed that people who do not display the 
appropriate emotions before they decide….have an impaired ability to make good decisions.  An 
inability to be guided by a “healthy fear” of bad consequences is a disastrous flaw” (6).  This 
means that companies need to organize their ability to doubt.  The sense of vulnerability will 
improve risk assessments and open our eyes to risky behavior that was previously accepted.   
Reluctance to Simplify 
Simplification is detrimental because it tends to close avenues for discussion and creates the kind 
of paradigm that was discussed earlier.  Companies should simplify as late as possible to avoid 
the biases that inevitably come with a set paradigm (5).    
The reluctance to simplify also fights against structural secrecy since it is counter to the formal 
communication efforts that are intended to streamline the communication process.  Identifying 
failures becomes more common because the more one knows; the more one realizes the extent of 
his ignorance.   
Sensitivity to Operations  
The concept of sensitivity to operations requires understanding the actual effectiveness of a 
system regardless of designs and intentions.  It requires leaders to maintain constant contact with 
the operating system and to be available when problems arise.  It is a lack of sensitivity to 
operations that allows paradigms to persist.  Operations gain a type of momentum where data is 
processed by rote without consideration given to new possibilities.  Weick and Sutcliffe suggest 
that for momentum to be overcome, one has to slow or stop the normal processes; even to the 
point of creating interruptions (5).  These interruptions are needed to allow people time to 
rethink, reorganize, and challenge the existing paradigm. 
Commitment to Resilience  
In this context, resilience describes one’s ability to make sense of information encountered in an 
unexpected situation.  An HRO must be committed to improving employee knowledge and 
ability to act during an emergency.  Ideally, people must be experienced enough to act but 
willing to treat past incidents as somewhat irrelevant.  Since each situation is unique, it is 
important to make new assessments prior to employing past tactics. 
Deference to Expertise 
Deference to expertise describes an individual’s willingness to yield decisions to others because 
they know the limits of their own knowledge and experience (5).  They realize that the core of 
the expert’s role is to provide knowledge that we could attain for ourselves if we had enough 
time.  An important aspect is that people understand that authority does not necessarily equate to 
expertise and that greater expertise is not always found as one goes higher in the organizational 
chart.  For example, a Site Manager has the authority to make any risk decision but may not have 
the expertise to make a good decision.  Companies must identify experts and develop avenues to 
allow decisions to flow to them.   
Application of HRO Principles to Combat NoD 
How do we apply these HRO principles to the three areas that contribute to Normalization of 
Deviance:  the production of a work group culture, the culture of production, and structural 
secrecy?  The production of work group culture is the cycle of signals, reviews, and acceptance 
of risk that industry most often describes as Normalization of Deviance.  It is believed that this 
area is most likely to be controlled by a solid process safety program.  Still, since these programs 
will never be 100% effective, companies should develop programs to break paradigms inherent 
in engineering culture and to offset the aspects inherent in structural secrecy.   
Table 1 is a sampling of suggestions provided by Weick and Sutcliffe.  It gives concepts that can 
be used to develop site programs.  For example, using the premortem concept (7) in a Job Safety 
Analysis or as part of Management of Change could be an effective way to identify faulty 
paradigms.  Structural secrecy seems to be a larger challenge because less communication and 
less simplification can be competing goals.  Ultimately, it is up to each employee to be vigilant at 
seeking out and communicating bad news.  The bearer of bad news needs to view his 
responsibility as an on-going alert rather than a one-time flare of concern.   
At Albemarle, efforts to develop some of these concepts into a company-wide program have just 
begun.  It is hoped that other companies will take these concepts and develop effective programs 
that can be shared within the chemical and refining industries to improve performance with 
respect to Normalization of Deviance. 
 
  
Table 1:  Improvement Concepts for High Reliability Organizations
5
Preoccupation with Failure
Companies must establish preoccupation as a strategy.  Instead of a 
strategy focusing on what the company wants to accomplish, focus on the 
errors that you don’t want to make.
Consider a “premortem” – A premortem is a technique developed by Gary 
Klein where a work group meets, assume their project or organization has 
just experienced a disaster, then writes a brief history to describe how the 
event would have occurred.6
Reluctance to Simplify
Encourage healthy skepticism in your processes; it is a form of 
redundancy
Develop a culture where new evidence requires a revision of the 
paradigm.
Sensitivity to Operations
Encourage and reward people who speak up; including dissenting views.  
Develop a culture that sees interruption as an opportunity rather than a 
nuisance.
Preoccupation with Failure
Managers should make it a practice to ask employees, “What is the 
biggest risk in your process?”  People need to be reminded that failure is 
possible.  
Managers must seek bad news because it is not as likely to be 
communicated as good news.
Sensitivity to Operations
Reward managers who stay close to the operating system or frontline 
activities.
Deference to Expertise
Be aware of the “fallacy of centrality.”  This assumes that since you are in 
a central position if something serious were happening, you would know 
about it.  And since you don’t know about it, it isn’t happening.
Do not inflate your own expertise and be wary of others who inflate theirs.  
Such people are less curious about the world and are more vulnerable to 
surprises.  The mistaken claim that “nothing is happening” can be 
interpreted as no one was looking, asking, or listening.
5
  Unless otherwise noted, concepts gleaned from Managing the Unexpected, Weick and Sutcliffe
6
  Performing a Project Premortum, Klein, Harvard Business Review, Sept 2007
Engineering Culture
Structural Secrecy
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Appendix A:  Example of Glass Repair Matrix 
 
